Although no express reference to this doctrine was made in the case law of the CJEU prior to the 2009 Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Colomer in the Budweiser case, 30 since the early 1980s 31 debate around EU pre-emption has increasingly gained momentum, and has indeed developed in parallel to what appears a clearer discussion around supremacy of EU law. The assimilation of pre-emption problems to supremacy questions has been indicated as the main reason for the under-theorised nature of the pre-emption phenomenon. 32 Although related, the two doctrines remain in fact distinct:
"Supremacy denotes the superior hierarchical status of the Union legal order over the national legal orders and thus gives European law the capacity to preempt national law. The doctrine of preemption, on the other hand, denotes the actual degree to which national law will be set aside by European law."
33
Drawing from US experience, 34 three general categories of pre-emption have been identified in EU law. 35 The first one is 'field' pre-emption, which applies where EU law has an exclusive competence in a certain area: national laws may be enacted only with the authorisation of EU law. The second category is 'rule' pre-emption, which is relevant to areas in which EU law and Member States share competences:
national measures may be adopted but these will be set aside if they conflict with EU law. The third type is 'obstacle' pre-emption: Member States are free to legislate in certain areas, but must not adopt measures that obstruct the effectiveness of EU policies. In US constitutionalism, the latter has proved the most elusive to define, especially if it is taken to displace "any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law". measures to make available on a website open to the public a clickable link to a work broadcast by the relevant copyright holder. Significantly less consideration has been devoted to the other questions, in particular the following:
"Is it possible for a Member State to give wider protection to authors' exclusive right by enabling 'communication to the public' to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of 42 It should be noted that, following the CJEU decision in Case C-128/ 
CJEU Case Law Suggests that InfoSoc Exclusive Rights May Not Be Altered
In its 2012 decision in Case C-277/10 Luksan, the CJEU considered whether an Austrian law that provided that all exclusive exploitation rights in a film vested in its producer and not also in its principal director, as is instead under relevant EU directives, was compliant with EU law. The Austrian Government had relied on Article 14bis(a) of the Berne Convention to advance the proposition that ownership of copyright in a cinematographic work is a matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed. 
EU Pre-Emption and InfoSoc Exceptions and Limitations
The InfoSoc Directive harmonised copyright exceptions and limitations, in the belief that -as with exclusive rights -differences among the laws of Member States had direct negative effects on the functioning of the internal market, and that such differences would have become more pronounced in view of the further development of cross-border exploitation of works. 55 While the Directive purported to define exceptions and limitations more harmoniously, it was felt that their degree of harmonisation should both be based on their impact on the smooth functioning of the internal market 56 and take account of the different legal traditions in Member States.
57
Use of the term 'expressions or limitations' in Article 5 appears to go beyond the legacy of the language employed in international instruments. 58 In her Opinion in Joined Cases C-457-460/11 VG Wort,
59
Advocate General Sharpston clarified that a copyright limitation may be intended as something less than an exception. In any case, the catalogue of exceptions and limitations to InfoSoc exclusive rights is an The general limit is that set by of Article 5(5), which intended to import the three-step test into EU law, and is directed at national legislators and courts alike. 64 Exceptions 65 should be limited to special cases and may not be applied in a way that is prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the rightholder or conflicts with the normal exploitation of his/her work or other subject-matter. Similarly to exclusive rights, an incoherent national drafting of exceptions and limitations would frustrate (or rather: have frustrated) the objectives that the EU intended to achieve by adopting the InfoSoc Directive, notably establishing a level playing field for copyright. Ultimately, this would be also tantamount to a breach of Member States' obligations under EU law, including the doctrine of pre-emption. As will be seen below, sub §4.3., this conclusion appears supported by the recent -yet scarcely (if at all) considereddecisions in Cases C-510/10 TV2 Danmark and -prior to it (although perhaps less explicitly) -C-467/08
Padawan.
Article 5 also codifies a number of hypotheses in which the conjunction 'or' is used to indicate distinct options and purposes, as is the case of Article 5(2)(c), and Articles 5(3)(a), (c), (e), (g), (j), (k), (l), and (n). So, taking for instance the case of Article 5(3)(e) 81 , it would seem that Member States have the choice whether to provide for a specific exception or limitation to the rights of reproduction and communication/making available to the public in respect of: (i) uses for the purposes of public security;
(ii) uses to ensure the proper performance of certain proceedings which may be -disjunctivelyadministrative, parliamentary, and/or judicial); (iii) uses to ensure the proper reporting of certain proceedings which may be -again, disjunctively -administrative, parliamentary, and/or judicial.
As the CJEU explained in Case C-145/10 Painer, in instances like that of Article 5(3)(e)
Member States' discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by EU law, including the principle of proportionality. 82 In accordance with this principle, the measures that the Member States may adopt 80 See especially Recitals 7 and 31.
"Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases … (e) use for the purposes of public security or to ensure the proper performance or reporting of administrative, parliamentary or judicial proceedings".
82 Case C-145/10 Painer, cit., para 105. must be appropriate for attaining their objective and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.
party to the Berne Convention, the EU is nevertheless obliged to comply with it, pursuant to Article 1(4) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 90 Article 11bis(3) of Berne expressly states that it is a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the regulations for ephemeral recordings made by a broadcasting organisation by means of its own facilities and used for its own broadcasts. That being so, by adopting the InfoSoc Directive, the EU exercised the competence previously devolved on the Member States in the area 83 Ibid., para 106. 84 Ibid., para 107. 85 Ibid., para 108. 86 Ibid., para 110. 87 Ibid., para 109.
88 Article 5(2)(d) also envisages the possibility for Member States to allow the preservation of ephemeral recordings in official archives on the grounds of their exceptional documentary character.
89 Case C-510/10 TV2 Danmark, cit., para 28. 90 See above sub §3.2.
of copyright. As a result, within the scope of that directive, the EU must be regarded as having taken the place of the Member States, which are no longer competent to implement the relevant stipulations of the Berne Convention. 91 It is settled case law 92 that, if a provision of EU law makes no express reference to the law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope, then -in compliance with the need for a uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality -the terms of such provision must be given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. The objective of the InfoSoc Directive was to harmonise certain aspects of the law on copyright and related rights in the information society, and ensure that competition in the internal market was not distorted as a result of differences in the legislation of Member States. This requires the elaboration of autonomous concepts of EU law: exercising that option afforded to them by European Union law, have introduced an exception of that kind, are free to determine, in an un-harmonised manner, the limits thereof, inter alia as regards the facilities used to make those ephemeral recordings, would be contrary to the objective of that directive as set out in the preceding paragraph, inasmuch as the limits of that exception could vary from one Member State to another and would therefore give rise to potential inconsistencies".
94
In so concluding, the CJEU confirmed and made more explicit the implications of its earlier decision in Case C-467/08 Padawan. This was a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning -among other thingsthe notion of 'fair compensation' in Article 5(2)(b), in particular whether this must be regarded as an autonomous concept of EU law which, as such, must be interpreted in a uniform manner in all Member 91 Ibid. 
Unharmonised Rights and Related Exceptions and Limitations
This contribution has attempted to show that the InfoSoc Directive has harmonised certain exclusive rights and related exceptions and limitations in a way that might have left Member States with much less flexibility than has been traditionally understood. As a result the marge de manoeuvre for national initiatives should be understood as narrower. Subject to their own international obligations, Member States are however able to legislate autonomously in respect of unharmonised rights, related exceptions, as well as neighbouring rights.
Influential commentators hold the view that this would be the case -amongst others -of the right of adaptation. rights and exceptions and limitations may be deemed sufficiently unconditional and precise so that one may rely upon them before the courts of a Member State that has failed to implement them correctly. The answer appears to be in the affirmative, in that Articles 2 to 5 (unless where otherwise provided) impose on Member
States, in unequivocal terms, well-defined obligations as to the result to be achieved that is not coupled with any condition regarding application of the rule laid down therein. "First, when national courts apply domestic law, they are bound to interpret it, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of any relevant directive, in order to achieve the result sought by the directive. That obligation is inherent in the system of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It enables those courts to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when they determine disputes within their jurisdiction.
Only if such an approach is not possible -for example, if it would lead to an interpretation contra legem -is it necessary to consider whether a relevant provision of a directive has direct effect and, if so, whether that direct effect may be relied on against a party to the national dispute."
122
The AG also stressed that it is for national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, eg taking the whole body of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, to ensure that Directive 2001/29/EC is fully effective, and thus achieve outcomes consistent with the objectives pursued by it. 123 She concluded that an interpretation of national law that would be inconsistent with the Directive is not permissible. 122 Ibid., paras 44-45.
